We i n v estigate a proposed reform of U.S. personal bankruptcy law which combines Chapters 7 and 13. The proposed reform obliges debtors in bankruptcy to use part of both their wealth and their future earnings to repay debt and therefore bases the obligation to repay in bankruptcy on debtors' ability-to-pay. An important function of personal bankruptcy is to provide partial wealth insurance for risk averse debtors by discharging some debt when debtors' ability to repay turns out to be low. However the current bankruptcy system encourages debtors to le for bankruptcy even when their ability t o repay is high. The proposed reform maintains the insurance function of bankruptcy, but reduces debtors' incentive to take advantage of the system. Using simulation techniques, we show that the reform improves e ciency relative to the current system.
discharge from most types of unsecured debt. Under Chapter 7, debtors do not have to give up any of their post-bankruptcy earnings, but they are obliged to use assets that exceed an exemption level to repay debt. Under Chapter 13, debtors are not required to give u p a n y of their assets, but they must propose a plan to use part of their future earnings for three years to repay debt. Because debtors are allowed to choose between the two Chapters and because most most debtors would not be obligated to repay a n ything under Chapter 7, most bankruptcy lings occur under Chapter 7. As a result, debtors are not required to use either their assets or their future income to repay debt. In addition, debtors who plan for bankruptcy in advance can shift assets from non-exempt to exempt categories and therefore increase the amount of assets that are exempt. This means that well-o debtors often bene t much more than poor debtors from ling for bankruptcy, i:e:; the nancial bene t of bankruptcy is very inequitably distributed. White 1998a has shown that up to one-third of U.S. households could bene t nancially from ling for bankruptcy if they plan strategically and that the nancial bene t from ling for bankruptcy is much greater for well-o debtors.
In this paper, we i n v estigate a proposed reform of U.S. bankruptcy law which combines Chapters 7 and 13. Debtors ling for bankruptcy would be obliged to use part of both their wealth and their future earnings to repay debt, but there would be exemptions for both. An advantage of the proposed reform is that|unlike the current Chapters 7 and 13|it makes the obligation to repay depend on ability t o p a y . Since ability t o p a y depends on both wealth and future earnings, the proposed reform requires that debtors use part of both|rather than part of one or the other|to repay debt. Another advantage of the proposed reform is that it would greatly improve equity b y concentrating the bene t of ling for bankruptcy on households having the lowest ability t o p a y . A third advantage of the proposed reform|which w e concentrate on in this paper|is that it would improve e ciency relative to the current bankruptcy system. An important role of bankruptcy is that of an insurance system which bene ts risk averse consumers by discharging some of their debt when their ability to repay turns out to be low. But the current bankruptcy system encourages debtors to behave strategically by ling for bankruptcy even when their ability to repay is high. The proposed reform reduces debtors' incentive t o b e h a v e strategically, while still preserving bankruptcy's insurance function. Our major result is that the proposed reform increases e ciency in a wide variety o f circumstances.
Section II brie y reviews the literature on personal bankruptcy. In section III, we describe our model of the current bankruptcy system and the proposed reform. Section IV describes the functional forms and parameter values that we use in the simulation and section V discusses the results. Section VI concludes.
Literature Review
In addition to the recent legislative proposals mentioned in the introduction, there have also been several proposals in the legal academic literature for reform of personal bankruptcy. Vukowich 1983 argued that more debtors should le under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7 and that Chapter 7 bankruptcy exemptions should be reduced as a means of encouraging more debtors to shift. Whitford 1989 proposed that the Chapter 13 bankruptcy procedure should be abolished and that all personal bankruptcy lings should be under Chapter 7. His argument is that debtors are unable to make an informed, self-interested choice between Chapters 7 and 13 and that, even if they could, ling under Chapter 13 is rarely in debtors' interest. Jackson 1986, pp. 254-7 did not propose any speci c bankruptcy reform, but he questioned the justi cation for exempting one hundred percent of post-bankruptcy income in the basic bankruptcy procedure, Chapter 7. He argued that income below some predetermined minimum level, rather than all income, ought to be protected by bankruptcy law. However he also argued that, of the various forms of wealth, earnings are most deserving of bankruptcy protection because they are derived from human capital and human capital is the least diversi able of all forms of capital.
Theoretical discussions of the justi cation for bankruptcy and of debtors' decisions to le for bankruptcy include Rea 1984 , Dye 1986 , Posner 1995 , and White 1998b . Buckley 1994 discusses explanations for the pro-debtor tilt of U.S. bankruptcy policy. Gropp, Scholz and White 1997 examine the e ect of bankruptcy exemptions on supply and demand for credit. Repetto 1998 shows that higher bankruptcy exemptions cause households to save less. Recent empirical models of bankruptcy lings include Domowitz and Eovaldi 1993 , Domowitz and Sartain 1997 , Buckley and Brinig 1998 , and Fay, Hurst and White 1998 . Sullivan et al 1989 discuss the characteristics of a sample of personal bankruptcy lings.
The Model
In this section we present our model of the bankruptcy system. The model is more complicated than necessary to describe the current U.S. bankruptcy system, but we also use it to analyze our proposed bankruptcy reform. We rst discuss the model when all consumers behave non-strategically and then introduce strategic behavior moral hazard adverse selection. 4 Non-strategic behavior All consumers are assumed to be identical as of period 1, so that we h a v e a representative agent model. Suppose in period 1 that consumers have w ealth W 1 , w ork hours N 1 and earnings Y 1 . Earnings are assumed to be proportional to work hours, or Y 1 = wN 1 , where w is the wage rate. W 1 , N 1 , w, and Y 1 are all known in advance and certain. In period 2, consumers have w ealth W 2 , w ork hours N 2 and earnings Y 2 = wN 2 . P eriod 2 wealth is uncertain, but all consumers have the same known wealth distribution, which i s f W 2 : P eriod 2 work hours are determined endogenously.
In period 1, the representative consumer borrows a constant, endogenously determined amount, B, at an endogenously determined interest rate r on an unsecured basis. For simplicity, w e assume that consumers have no prior loans. 5 In period 2, the loans come 4 In our discussion of the current U.S. bankruptcy system, we assume that all bankruptcy lings occur under Chapter 7. This is because debtors always have the right to le under Chapter 7 and usually they are obliged to repay less under Chapter 7. Therefore the amount debtors are willing to repay under Chapter 13 is no more than the amount they would be obliged to repay if they led under Chapter 7. For example, a debtor who has $10,000 in non-exempt assets would be obliged to repay $10,000 to creditors in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy ling and therefore would be willing to repay the equivalent of $10,000 from future earnings, but no more, in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy ling. A debtor who has no non-exempt assets would be willing to repay only a token amount from future earnings in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy ling. Because of this close connection between the two Chapters, we assume that all bankruptcy lings under the current bankruptcy system occur under Chapter 7.
5 See Bizer and DeMarzo 1992 for discussion of a model in which the debtor borrows from more than one creditor. due. At the beginning of period 2, consumers learn their wealth W 2 and they then decide whether to repay their debt in full or to le for bankruptcy. The out-of-pocket costs of ling for bankruptcy, which include bankruptcy court ling fees and lawyers' fees, are assumed to be a constant proportion c of period 2 wealth. 6 Suppose E denotes the wealth exemption in bankruptcy in the debtor's state of residence. E is assumed to be a xed dollar amount that combines the state's exemptions for all types of assets. 7 If consumers le for bankruptcy, they keep all their wealth if W 2 E, but they must give up their non-exempt wealth W 2 , E if W 2 E . T h us their net period 2 wealth is W 2 1 , c , max W 2 , E;0 if they le for bankruptcy. If they do not le for bankruptcy, then they repay their debt in full so their net period 2 wealth becomes W 2 , B1 + r. 8 We also de ne an exemption for post-bankruptcy earnings, denoted e, which is a proportion of period 2 earnings Y 2 . Post-bankruptcy earnings are completely exempt under the current Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure, so that e = 1 . But under the proposed reform, debtors would be obliged to use a portion of their post-bankruptcy earnings to repay debt, so that e 1. Therefore consumers' period 2 net earnings are eY 2 if they le for bankruptcy, where e 1, and Y 2 if they do not le for bankruptcy. In the theoretical discussion, we treat e as a xed proportion of Y 2 , but in the simulations we also consider a bankruptcy exemption that is a declining proportion of Y 2 . The fraction of period 2 earnings that is not exempt in bankruptcy, 1 , e , is also referred to as the bankruptcy tax" rate.
The representative consumers' utility function in period t is UP t ; N t , where P t denotes net purchasing power in period t and N t denotes hours of work in period t. Net purchasing power P t equals the sum of net wealth plus net earnings plus amounts borrowed minus amounts repaid minus bankruptcy costs, if any, in period t. We assume that U P 0 and U P P 0, so that consumers are risk averse, and U N 0, U NN 0, so that there is increasing marginal disutility from work e ort. We also assume that purchasing power and work hours are additively separable in the utility function, so that U P N = 0 .
The representative consumer's expected utility function as of period 1 is: W 2 denotes the level of net period 2 wealth at which consumers are indi erent between ling versus not ling for bankruptcy. The rst term in 1 is consumers' utility in period 1 and the second through fourth terms are consumers' expected utility in period 2 if they le for bankruptcy and repay nothing, if they le for bankruptcy and repay part of their debt, and if they do not le for bankruptcy, respectively. F or simplicity, consumers' rate of discount b e t w een periods 1 and 2 is assumed to be zero. Figure 1 As period 2 earnings rise, the wealth level at which consumers are indi erent b e t w een ling versus not ling for bankruptcy shifts to the left, so that consumers are less likely to le for bankruptcy. Figure 2 illustrates the e ect of varying the wealth and the earnings exemptions in bankruptcy, E and e. In the top panel, E falls to E 0 . As a result, consumers' period 2 expected net purchasing power falls when W 2 is in the intermediate region where E 0 W f W 2 , as shown by the shaded area. In the lower panel, e falls to e 0 . Consumers' net purchasing power now falls whenever 0 W 2 f W 2 , a s s h o wn by the shaded area. Thus a reduction in the earnings exemption e lowers consumers' purchasing power when it is at its lowest level, while a reduction in the wealth exemption only lowers purchasing power when it is above E 0 . If consumers are risk averse, a reduction in the wealth exemption E will tend to be preferred to a reduction in the earnings exemption e, assuming that both cost consumers the same expected amount, because the reduction in E does not lower purchasing power where the marginal utility of purchasing power is highest. 9 The representative consumer is assumed to determine the amount borrowed, B, and the number of work hours in period 2, N 2 , b y maximizing expected utility, eq. 1. The consumer makes both of these decisions as of period 1, i:e:; before she learns her actual period 2 wealth. 10 Since each consumer's demand for credit has only a negligible e ect on overall credit market conditions, the representative consumer treats the interest rate r as xed.
Lenders are assumed to be risk neutral and the lending industry is assumed to be competitive, so that lenders make zero pro ts. In order for lenders to be willing to lend, expected repayment, evaluated as of period 1, must just compensate lenders for their opportunity cost of funds, which is denoted r f . The zero pro t condition is: 10 Alternately, the consumer might decide on the number of work hours in period 2 after she learns her period 2 wealth. We assume that N 2 is chosen in period 1 in order to keep the model tractable.
Here the three terms correspond to expected repayment in period 2 when W 2 E, E W 2 f W 2 , and W 2 f W 2 , respectively. Consumers repay only from earnings if W 2 E , while they repay from both earnings and wealth if E W 2 f W 2 . If the government c hanges either the wealth exemption E or the post-bankruptcy earnings exemption e, then lenders change the interest rate so that the zero pro t condition remains satis ed. If we totally di erentiate 3 and use the envelope condition, then it is straightforward to show that lenders raise the interest rate when either E or e rises, holding the other xed. 11
Strategic behavior Just as consumers have an incentive to rearrange their income and wealth to minimize taxes, they also have an incentive to rearrange their wealth so as to get maximum nancial bene t from the bankruptcy system. As in the case of tax planning, there are a number of bankruptcy planning strategies and they range from the perfectly legal to the legally doubtful to the obviously fraudulent. Assume that there are two t ypes of borrowers, of which one type behaves non-strategically according to the model just discussed and the other type behaves strategically. As a simple means of representing a variety of bankruptcy planning strategies, we assume that strategic consumers rearrange their period 2 wealth so that, if they le for bankruptcy, an amount hW 2 is hidden from the bankruptcy court trustee, where 0 h 1. 12 As a result, strategic consumers repay less than non-strategic consumers from their period 2 wealth when both types le for bankruptcy. W e do not assume that strategic consumers hide any of their period 2 earnings, because bankruptcy trustees are assumed to be able to verify consumers' earnings more easily than they can verify consumers' wealth.
11 See Fay, Hurst and White 1998 for a proof when E changes. 12 Because states have separate exemptions for di erent t ypes of assets, many bankruptcy planning strategies involve converting assets from non-exempt to exempt forms. An example is for consumers to use non-exempt nancial assets to reduce the amount they owe on their mortgages, assuming that they own homes and their home equity is less than their state's homestead exemption. Another strategy is for consumers to purchase additional life insurance if they live in a state with a high exemption for life insurance. An example of a fraudulent strategy is for consumers to transfer ownership of nancial assets to relatives. See White 1998a for discussion of various bankruptcy strategies and calculations of the proportion of households that would bene t from ling for bankruptcy if they used these strategies. In the top panel of gure 3, the solid line represents non-strategic consumers' net period 2 w ealth, while the dashed line represents strategic consumers' net period 2 wealth. When consumers behave strategically, the wealth level at which they are indi erent b e t w een ling versus not ling for bankruptcy shifts to the right from f W 2 to f W 2 =1 , h. Strategic consumers are therefore more likely to le for bankruptcy than non-strategic consumers and the di erence increases as strategic behavior becomes more intense h rises. The shaded area in the top panel of gure 3 shows the increase in consumers' expected net wealth in period 2 when they behave strategically. However if the bankruptcy reform is in e ect, behaving strategically reduces consumers' period 2 net earnings. Both types of consumers pay the bankruptcy tax of 1 , eY 2 if they le for bankruptcy, but strategic consumers are more likely to pay the tax because they le for bankruptcy more often. The solid and dashed lines in the bottom panel of gure 3 show non-strategic and strategic consumers' net period 2 earnings after paying the bankruptcy tax, respectively. If consumers behave strategically, their period 2 net earnings fall by an amount 1 , e Y 2 if f W 2 W f W 2 =1 , h. The rectangular shaded area shows this loss. In period 1, both types of consumers apply for loans and strategic consumers are assumed to apply for the same loan amount B that non-strategic consumers wish to borrow. Lenders are assumed unable to identify whether individual consumers are strategic or nonstrategic, as long as both types apply to borrow the same amount. They therefore lend B and charge an interest rate r to both types. 13 Strategic consumers, like non-strategic 13 The assumption that a pooling equilibrium prevails in the credit market requires that strategic con-consumers, decide on their period 2 labor supply as of period 1. However, because strategic consumers have higher expected net purchasing power in period 2 and a di erent expected utility function from non-strategic consumers, their period 2 labor supply level di ers from that of non-strategic consumers. Strategic consumers' period 2 labor supply is denoted N s 2 , while non-strategic consumers' period 2 labor supply is still denoted N 2 . Behaving strategically to take advantage of bankruptcy is assumed to carry a stigma, which could represent consumers' level of guilt self-disapproval or could represent their perceptions of social disapproval of such behavior. 14 The cost of stigma, measured in units of utility, is assumed to vary across individual consumers. It is denoted S i and has the distribution function gS i . We nd it useful to think of S i as representing the number of times each y ear that consumer i attends religious services, where at each religious service a sermon is given that praises ethical behavior and stresses the obligation to repay one's debts. Consumers who attend religious services more frequently have higher levels of S i . Strategic consumers' expected utility function 4 is the same as non-strategic consumers' expected utility function 1 when h = 0 and S i = 0 .
Consumers decide whether to behave strategically or not in period 1. For consumer i, the gain from behaving strategically is the di erence between 4 and 1. There is a critical level of stigma, denoted S, such that consumers having stigma level S are indi erent between behaving strategically versus non-strategically. All consumers having S i S sumers be better o if they borrow the same amount as non-strategic consumers than they would be if they applied to borrow more than non-strategic consumers and thus allowed lenders to identify their types. In the simulations discussed below, we v erify that this condition always holds.
behave strategically and all those having S i S behave non-strategically. Here the two sets of terms in square brackets are expected repayment b y non-strategic and strategic consumers, respectively. 5 is the same as 3 when h = 0 o r p s = 0 .
When strategic behavior is introduced, the issue arises as to whether and how the social welfare function should weight the preferences of strategic consumers. We use the expected utility function of non-strategic consumers, eq. 1, as the social welfare function. This in e ect weights the preferences of strategic consumers as though they behaved nonstrategically and thus assigns a zero social weight to their gain from behaving strategically.
Under the current bankruptcy system, the only bankruptcy policy variable is the wealth exemption, E, while under the proposed reform, both E and e are policy variables. The government determines the bankruptcy policy variables by maximizing the social welfare function. The model's equations are non-strategic consumers' rst order conditions for B and N 2 not shown, strategic consumers' rst order condition for N s 2 not shown, lenders' zero pro t condition 5, the condition determining when non-strategic consumers le for bankruptcy 2, the condition determining the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically, and the rst order conditions for E and, where relevant, e not shown. The unknowns are B, r, N 2 , N s 2 , f W 2 , p s , E, and e. Rather than solve the model for e, w e evaluate it over a range of values of e.
Summary
The main economic function of the bankruptcy system is to discharge debt when period 2 net purchasing power turns out to be low, which bene ts risk averse consumers. But the current bankruptcy system encourages strategic behavior. Behaving strategically bene ts consumers both by raising their expected net purchasing power in period 2 as shown by the shaded area in the top panel of gure 3 and by reducing the riskiness of their net purchasing power. The costs of behaving strategically are that strategic consumers must bear the stigma cost S i and that they pay higher expected bankruptcy costs because they are more likely to le for bankruptcy. Consumers choose to behave strategically if these bene ts exceed costs. The higher the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically and or the more intense is strategic behavior higher h, the worse o are non-strategic consumers. This is because lenders respond to strategic behavior by raising interest rates and non-strategic consumers are more likely to bear the higher interest cost by repaying their debt in full. Now consider how adopting the proposed bankruptcy reform changes consumers' incentives. Assume that the level of E remains xed when the reform is adopted. In this case the reform makes both types of consumers worse o , because they must pay the bankruptcy tax on earnings when they le for bankruptcy and because the tax makes period 2 net purchasing power more risky as shown in the lower panel of gure 2. But the reform discourages strategic behavior, because strategic consumers le for bankruptcy more often and therefore are more likely to pay the bankruptcy tax. Adopting the reform also causes interest rates to fall, which bene ts non-strategic consumers more than strategic consumers. Now suppose the level of E is also allowed to vary when the bankruptcy reform is adopted. In this case the increase in the riskiness of net purchasing power caused by levying the bankruptcy tax can be o set by simultaneously raising the wealth exemption E. T h us the optimal bankruptcy reform may i n v olve t w o c hanges: imposing a bankruptcy tax i:e:; lowering the earnings exemption e and raising the wealth exemption E. The simulation investigates whether adopting the reform is worthwhile, taking all of these factors into e ect.
Functional Forms and Parameter Values
Period 1 labor supply, N 1 , is assumed to be xed at 6.8 hours per day. The wage rate, w, is assumed to equal $4,680. This value results from assuming a wage rate of $18.00 per hour and 260 work days per year. 15 Period 1 wealth W 1 is assumed to be $10,000. The function fW 2 has a log-normal distribution with LN4:91212; 0:443878. Using these assumptions, W 2 has a mean value of $150,000 and a standard deviation of $70,000. We assume that the mean value of W 2 is much greater than the mean value of W 1 , because consumers in this situation have a strong incentive to borrow in the rst period in order to smooth their purchasing power over time. Thus the model can be thought o f as representing consumers who are just entering the labor force in period 1 and tend to accumulate wealth over time.
The risk free interest rate r f is assumed to be .05 and bankruptcy costs are assumed to equal 10 of period 2 wealth, or c = :1. In time period t, the utility function is: UP t ; N t = logP t ,vN t where 1= , 1 is the elasticity of labor substitution. Following Kimball 1995, we assume that = 11 and therefore the elasticity of labor supply is .1. v represents the disutility o f w ork and is a free parameter used for scaling the model. It takes the value 5:118 exp ,11 . 16 The stigma function gS i is assumed to have a log-normal distribution, where gS i i s distributed as LN1, 4.58926. These parameter values were selected so that the proportion of consumers that chooses to behave strategically is about .15 in the base case model with strategic behavior column 2 of table 1. 15 The hourly wage rate used here is higher than the average gure in the U.S. economy, which is about $12.00. We use the higher gure in order to loosely represent the entire household's wage rate, where the average household has more than one worker. 16 v is assumed to take the the value that would result if there were no uncertainty in the model, if there were no strategic behavior, if the current bankruptcy system were in e ect, and if consumers were indi erent b e t w een ling versus not ling for bankruptcy. If we set the rst order condition for maximizing expected utility with respect to N 2 when households do not le for bankruptcy equal to zero, we get w=W 2 +wN 2 , B1 + r = vN ,1 2 : We then substitute the condition under which households are indi erent b e t w een ling versus not ling for bankruptcy under the current bankruptcy system, which is B1 + r = W 2 1 + c , E. Substituting the values given in the text for each of the parameters and a value of E of 15 of mean period 2 wealth, we get the value for v given in the text.
We run four sets of simulations. In the rst, we solve for the optimal value of E under the current bankruptcy system, assuming that there is no strategic behavior. Then, holding E constant, we allow consumers to choose between behaving strategically versus non-strategically and we i n troduce the bankruptcy reform. The bankruptcy tax rate on future earnings, 1,e, takes the predetermined value of zero under the current bankruptcy system and takes the values of 7 and 15 under the reform. We also vary the intensity of strategic behavior by assuming that the fraction of strategic consumers' period 2 wealth that is hidden from the bankruptcy trustee, h, takes values of 0, .1, .2, and .3. The second set of simulations repeats the rst except that we solve for the optimal wealth exemption level for each combination of values of 1 , e and h. The third and fourth sets of simulations repeat the rst and second, but we assume that the bankruptcy tax is a rising|rather than constant|proportion of period 2 earnings. Speci cally, w e assume that 1 , e = 1 exp 2 Y 2 , where 1 = :01, 2 = .067 or .093, and Y 2 is expressed in thousands of dollars. These values imply that the bankruptcy tax rate on the rst dollar of post-bankruptcy earnings is always 1, but that it rises to 7 or 15, respectively, when earnings are approximately $29,000. 17 Thus under the bankruptcy reform with the rising tax rate, the marginal tax rates are the same as in the analogous proportional tax cases, but the dollar amounts repaid in bankruptcy are lower. We also examine rising bankruptcy tax rate schedules with higher marginal rates. 18
Results
Column 1 of table 1 shows the results in the base case. Here, the current bankruptcy system is in e ect e = 1, there is no strategic behavior p s = 0 and h = 1, and the wealth exemption E is set at its optimal level, denoted E , which turns out to be $20,310. The equilibrium loan amount i s B = $58,353 and the equilibrium interest rate is r = :084: Labor supply in period 2, N 2 , is 6.213 hours per day, which means that post-bankruptcy earnings are 6.213$4,680 or approximately $29,000. Consumers' probability of ling for bankruptcy, denoted p b , is .095. 19 In all the other columns of table 1, E remains xed at its base case value of $20,310.
The top panel of table 1 corresponds to the current bankruptcy system. Reading across the table, the intensity of strategic behavior increases from none h = 0 in the base case to mild" h = :1 in column 2 to medium" h = :2 in column 3 to strong" h = :3 in column 4. The middle and bottom panels represent the bankruptcy reform with bankruptcy tax rates of 7 and 15, respectively. Reading down any column corresponds to increasing the bankruptcy tax rate, holding constant the intensity of strategic behavior.
In column 2, the current bankruptcy system remains in e ect, but consumers are allowed to choose between non-strategic behavior versus mild strategic behavior where h = .1. Even though strategic behavior involves hiding only 10 of wealth, about 15 of consumers choose to behave strategically. Consumers who behave strategically are 50 more likely to le for bankruptcy than consumers who do not: the probabilities of ling for bankruptcy are p b = :094 and p s b = :141 for non-strategic and strategic consumers, respectively. Because the default rate rises, the interest rate on loans also rises, from .084 in column 1 to .087 in column 2. As a result, non-strategic consumers prefer to borrow less and the amount borrowed falls from $58,353 in column 1 to $58,085 in column 2. The introduction of strategic behavior makes non-strategic consumers worse o , so that the social welfare level is lower in column 2 than in column 1.
In column 6 in the middle panel, consumers still choose between behaving nonstrategically versus engaging in mild strategic behavior, but now w e i n troduce the bankruptcy reform with a bankruptcy tax rate of 7. We assume that the wealth exemption in bankruptcy, E, remains at its base case value of $20,310. The assumption that the bankruptcy reform might be adopted but that the wealth exemption would remain unchanged is reasonable since, if Congress adopted the reform proposal discussed here, it might continue the present procedure of allowing the states to set their own wealth ex-emptions in bankruptcy. Most states would probably respond by leaving their current exemptions unchanged. Imposing the bankruptcy tax on earnings reduces the attractiveness of behaving strategically, since strategic consumers are more likely to le for bankruptcy and therefore to pay the tax. As a result, the probability of strategic behavior falls from .15 to .141. The bankruptcy tax also makes ling for bankruptcy less attractive for both types of consumers. As a result, the probability of bankruptcy falls from .094 in column 2 to .078 in column 6 for non-strategic consumers and from .141 to .118 for strategic consumers. The bankruptcy tax also makes period 2 purchasing power more risky, since consumers may h a v e to repay part of their debt from earnings even when period 2 wealth turns out to be low and they le for bankruptcy. T o o set the increased risk, consumers borrow less, so that B falls from $58,085 to $56,779. The imposition of the bankruptcy tax has two o setting e ects on work hours. The tax reduces net earnings and therefore causes work hours to fall, but the increased riskiness of period 2 purchasing power when the tax is in e ect gives consumers an incentive to raise their work hours as a means of reducing risk. For non-strategic consumers, the latter e ect dominates and work hours increase slightly from 6.209 to .6215. For strategic consumers, the former e ect dominates since they are more likely to le for bankruptcy and, as a result, their work hours fall from 6.25 to 6.24. The adoption of the bankruptcy reform raises the social welfare level, from 9.1191 in column 2 to 9.11929 in column 6.
Moving rightward in table 1 corresponds to raising the intensity of strategic behavior, while moving downward corresponds to raising the bankruptcy tax rate. As strategic behavior becomes more intense, consumers' probability of behaving strategically and strategic consumers' probability of ling for bankruptcy both rise quickly. F or example when the current bankruptcy system is in e ect and strategic behavior is medium, 19 of consumers behave strategically and 21 of strategic consumers le for bankruptcy, while these gures rise to 22 and 30, respectively, when strategic behavior is strong. When the bankruptcy reform goes into e ect, both of these gures fall. For example, when strategic behavior is strong and the bankruptcy reform with a tax rate of 7 is adopted, the probability that consumers behave strategically falls from .22 to .21 and the probability that strategic consumers le for bankruptcy falls from .30 to .26. Now consider the e ect of adopting the bankruptcy reform on the level of social welfare. In each column of the table, the bankruptcy regime that maximizes social welfare is indicated by boldface type. When there is no strategic behavior, there is no gain from adopting the bankruptcy reform and the current bankruptcy system is optimal. But whenever strategic behavior occurs, the bankruptcy reform is preferred over the current bankruptcy system. Under mild strategic behavior, the optimal bankruptcy tax rate is 7. Under medium strategic behavior, the optimal bankruptcy tax rate is 15 and, under strong strategic behavior, the optimal bankruptcy tax rate is a surprisingly high 55. 20 Thus the more intense is strategic behavior, the higher is the optimal bankruptcy tax rate. This is because as strategic behavior becomes more intense, non-strategic consumers have a greater incentive to discourage it, which they can do only by raising the bankruptcy tax rate.
We can also measure the e ectiveness of bankruptcy reform in discouraging strategic behavior by examining how many additional bankruptcy lings are caused by strategic behavior under the reform versus under the current bankruptcy system. The expected number of additional bankruptcy lings that results from strategic behavior is p s p s b +1, p s p b ,p b . When the current bankruptcy system is in e ect, this gure becomes .0071, .0217 and .0466 for mild, medium and strong strategic behavior, respectively. When the bankruptcy system is optimized for each level of strategic behavior, the gures are .0056, .0153, and .0112, respectively. Thus adopting the optimal bankruptcy system reduces excess bankruptcy lings by 20 when strategic behavior is mild, 29.5 when strategic behavior is medium and 76 when strategic behavior is strong. Now turn to table 2. Here we repeat the analysis of table 1 except that, in each column, we solve for the optimal wealth exemption in bankruptcy, E . The wealth exemption in the base case, column 1, is again E = $20,310. When the wealth exemption is reoptimized for each combination of values of h and the bankruptcy tax rate, it rises as the bankruptcy tax rate increases, holding the intensity of strategic behavior constant i:e:; moving downward in the table. This is because increasing the bankruptcy tax rate 20 The results in this case not shown in table 1 makes non-strategic consumers worse o by raising the riskiness of their net period 2 purchasing power, but the increased risk can be o set by raising the wealth exemption level. When both the wealth exemption and the bankruptcy tax rate are allowed to vary at the same time, increases in the tax rate and reductions in E have o setting e ects, so that the amount borrowed, the interest rate, the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically, and the probabilities of both groups ling for bankruptcy all remain virtually unchanged. For example, when strategic behavior is mild, non-strategic consumers prefer a w ealth exemption of $18,850 when the current bankruptcy system is in e ect, $20,890 when the bankruptcy tax rate is 7 and $23,210 when the bankruptcy tax rate is 15. In all three cases, the proportion of consumers that chooses to behave strategically is about .143 and the probabilities that non-strategic and strategic consumers le for bankruptcy are .082 and .124, respectively. The amount borrowed and the interest rate remain constant at $57,130 and .081, respectively. Now suppose the intensity of strategic behavior increases, holding the bankruptcy tax rate constant i:e:; a m o v e to the right in table 2. The increase in the intensity o f strategic behavior makes non-strategic consumers worse o and, since the bankruptcy tax rate remains constant, it is e cient to discourage strategic behavior by reducing the wealth exemption level. For example, when the current bankruptcy system is in e ect and strategic behavior intensi es from mild to medium, the optimal wealth exemption falls from $18,850 to $15,440. In this case the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically rises from .143 to .170, or by 19. If instead the wealth exemption level remained constant, then the results in table 1 tell us that the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically would have risen from .15 to 192, or by 28. The table illustrates that reductions in the wealth exemption level and increases in the bankruptcy tax rate are alternative means of discouraging strategic behavior. Since both changes make non-strategic consumers worse o by increasing the riskiness of period 2 net purchasing power, the optimal bankruptcy system involves either raising both the tax rate and the level of E simultaneously or lowering both simultaneously. Now consider the optimal bankruptcy system in the context of table 2. Once again when there is no strategic behavior, the best bankruptcy system is the current system with a bankruptcy tax rate of zero and a wealth exemption level of $20,310. When strategic behavior intensi es from none to mild, the optimal bankruptcy system shifts to the bankruptcy reform with a tax rate of 15 and an increase in the wealth exemption level from $20,310 to $23,210. However when strategic behavior intensi es from mild to medium, the preferred bankruptcy system does not involve raising the bankruptcy tax rate further. Instead, the best bankruptcy system involves reducing the bankruptcy tax rate to zero and reducing the wealth exemption level from $23,210 to $15,440. Thus the results suggest that the optimal bankruptcy system involves a shifting tradeo between the bankruptcy tax rate and the wealth exemption level as the intensity of strategic behavior changes. When strategic behavior is mild, the best approach is to adopt the bankruptcy reform with a high tax rate, but to o set the resulting increase in risk by raising the wealth exemption level. But as strategic behavior becomes more intense, the optimal bankruptcy system involves eliminating the bankruptcy tax completely and, instead, discouraging strategic behavior by reducing the wealth exemption level. Now turn to table 3, which gives results for the bankruptcy reform when the tax rate on post-bankruptcy earnings rises, rather than remaining constant, as earnings increase. As in table 1, the wealth exemption in bankruptcy, E, remains xed at $20,310. Because the results under the current bankruptcy system are the same in tables 1 and 3, we omit the analysis of the current bankruptcy system from table 3. The rising bankruptcy tax schedule in the top panel of table 3 imposes a 1 tax on the rst dollar of earnings, rising to 7 on the marginal dollar of earnings. Consumers who are subject to this bankruptcy tax schedule repay less than those who are subject to the constant bankruptcy tax rate of 7 discussed in table 1, but both face the same incentives at the margin. The rising tax rate schedule does not increase the riskiness of period 2 purchasing power as much a s the analogous constant tax rate schedule, because taxation of inframarginal earnings is at lower rates. In the middle panel and bottom panels of table 3, the tax rate schedules again are 1 on the rst dollar of earnings, rising to 15 and 20, respectively, on the marginal dollar of earnings. This means that the marginal tax rate in the middle panel of table 3 is the same as that in the bottom panel of table 1. Under the reform with the rising bankruptcy tax rate, the obligation to repay debt from earnings in bankruptcy is lower and therefore behaving strategically and ling for bankruptcy are both more attractive than in table 1. As a result, the interest rate rises, but consumers nonetheless increase their borrowing because bankruptcy provides better insurance against the risk that period 2 net purchasing power turns out to be low. For example when the marginal tax rate is 7 and strategic behavior is medium, the proportion of consumers that behaves strategically is .188 in Now consider the optimal bankruptcy system under the rising tax rate schedule. Again when there is no strategic behavior, the current bankruptcy system is preferred. 21 But when mild strategic behavior is introduced, the bankruptcy reform with a marginal tax rate of 20 on earnings is preferred. When strategic behavior intensi es to medium, the bankruptcy reform with a very high marginal tax rate of 85 is preferred. 22 From table 1, the optimal constant bankruptcy tax rates are 7 and 15, when strategic behavior is mild and medium, respectively. Because the rising bankruptcy tax rate schedule is less e ective in discouraging strategic behavior and bankruptcy than a constant bankruptcy tax rate, the optimal marginal tax rate is higher under the rising than the constant tax rate schedule. 23 In general when the bankruptcy reform involves a rising rather than constant tax rate on post-bankruptcy earnings, the bankruptcy reform again dominates the current bankruptcy system whenever consumers behave strategically. The optimal tax rate on the marginal dollar of earnings is higher under the rising tax rate schedule than under the constant tax rate.
The nal set of simulations, shown in we solve for the optimal wealth exemption level E for each set of parameter values. The two panels of table 4 correspond to rising tax rate schedules with marginal tax rates of 7 and 15, respectively. T h us the top and bottom panels of table 4 correspond to the middle and bottom panels of table 2, respectively. The results in table 4 are similar to those in table 2. As strategic behavior becomes more intense, holding the bankruptcy tax schedule constant, the optimal wealth exemption level E falls. But as the bankruptcy tax schedule shifts upward, holding the intensity of strategic behavior constant, the optimal wealth exemption E rises. However, because the riskiness of period 2 purchasing power is smaller under the rising tax rate schedule than under the constant tax rate schedule, the optimal wealth exemption E is always smaller in magnitude under the rising tax rate schedule. As an example, when the constant tax rate of 7 is in e ect and strategic behavior is mild, the optimal wealth exemption is $20,890. But when the rising tax rate schedule with a marginal tax rate of 7 is in e ect and strategic behavior is mild, the optimal wealth exemption is only $19,750.
The optimal bankruptcy system in table 4 is the same as that in table 2. When strategic behavior is mild, the optimal bankruptcy system is the bankruptcy reform with either a constant tax rate of 7 or the rising tax rate schedule with a marginal rate of 7. But when strategic behavior intensi es from mild to medium, the optimal bankruptcy system shifts back to the current system with a zero tax rate on earnings. Instead, non-strategic consumers prefer to discourage strategic behavior by adopting a lower wealth exemption level.
Conclusion
An important function of a personal bankruptcy system is to provide partial wealth insurance to consumers. The bankruptcy system bene ts risk averse consumers by reducing the riskiness of their future purchasing power since, if wealth turns out to be low when debts come due, consumers can le for bankruptcy and some of their debts will be discharged. However, the current bankruptcy system gives consumers an incentive to behave strategically by ling for bankruptcy and obtaining discharge of debt even when their ability to repay is high. A large fraction of U.S. households has an incentive to take advantage of the bankruptcy system, which in part accounts for the rapidly rising bankruptcy ling rate.
Under our proposed bankruptcy reform, debtors ling for bankruptcy would be obliged to use part of both their wealth and their future earnings to repay debt, so the obligation to repay debt in bankruptcy would depend on ability to repay. This is in contrast to the current system, which only obliges debtors to use non-exempt wealth to repay debt, while future earnings are completely exempt. The obligation to use part of their future earnings to repay debt discourages debtors from taking advantage of the bankruptcy system, because by doing so they become more likely to pay the bankruptcy tax."
We analyze two v ersions of the bankruptcy reform. In the rst, the wealth exemption in bankruptcy is assumed to remain xed when the bankruptcy reform is adopted. This is a reasonable assumption since, under current l a w, each individual state is allowed to set its own wealth exemption in bankruptcy. The result in this case is that, whenever there is strategic behavior, the bankruptcy reform is preferred over the current bankruptcy system. The more intense is strategic behavior, the higher is the optimal bankruptcy tax rate on future earnings. In the second version of the bankruptcy reform, both the wealth exemption in bankruptcy and the bankruptcy tax rate are allowed to vary. Since reducing the wealth exemption and imposing a bankruptcy tax on earnings both have the e ect of discouraging strategic behavior, the optimal bankruptcy system could use either policy instrument. The results show that when there is mild" strategic behavior, the optimal bankruptcy system involves adopting the bankruptcy reform with a bankruptcy tax on earnings, but simultaneously raising the wealth exemption in bankruptcy as a means of reducing risk. However when strategic behavior is more intense, the optimal bankruptcy system involves a reversal. The current bankruptcy system with no tax on future earnings is preferred, but the wealth exemption in bankruptcy is reduced to discourage strategic behavior. Finally we consider a bankruptcy tax schedule in which the marginal tax rate on post-bankruptcy earnings rises rather than remaining constant as earnings rise. Under the rising bankruptcy tax schedule, the bankruptcy reform again dominates the current bankruptcy system and the optimal tax rate on the marginal dollar of earnings is higher than under the constant tax rate schedule. In general the results show that the proposed bankruptcy reform dominates the current bankruptcy system in a wide range of circumstances. The current bankruptcy system is optimal when there is no strategic behavior. The optimal bankruptcy tax schedule has a marginal tax rate of 85 when strategic behavior is medium and 100 when strategic behavior is strong. The optimal bankruptcy system in these cases is the current system with a zero tax rate on earnings.
